On July 7, 2004, Bennie Dean Herring went to the Coffee County sheriff’s department in Alabama to retrieve something from his impounded truck. Investigator Mark Anderson asked warrant clerk Sandy Pope to check whether Herring was wanted. She found no local warrant and contacted neighboring Dale County clerk Sharon Morgan, whose computer listed an active warrant for failure to appear on a felony charge. In the Supreme Court’s account, Pope requested a faxed copy as confirmation.

The warrant had been recalled five months earlier.

The FBI is investigating an apparent intrusion into the National Crime Information Center, first reported on Nov. 20, citing two people briefed on the investigation. NCIC connects federal, state and local law enforcement, supplying information officers use to check warrants and locate missing people, work that depends on the accuracy of the records they receive.

What Changed

AI-generated summary, reviewed by an editor. More on our AI guidelines.

The current investigation

The FBI had no comment as of Friday night.

As of Nov. 21, public information did not establish what was accessed, whether information was copied or altered, who was responsible, or whether routine queries were disrupted.

A former FBI official who led investigations into cybercriminal groups expressed concern that intruders could “compromise the accuracy of the information that officers rely on.”

The FBI’s privacy assessment describes checks on records when agencies submit them and requirements for reviewing the information after it enters the system.

What a match means

NCIC held more than 19.3 million records during fiscal 2025, a system high documented in the CJIS division’s annual review. Those records are shared across jurisdictions. Its files cover wanted and missing people as well as property, including stolen guns.

The FBI’s missing-person report illustrates how those files change. Agencies made 498,038 entries to the Missing Person File during calendar 2025, while 88,093 records in that file remained active on Dec. 31. The first figure measures entries over the full year. The second measures the active inventory on one date. The same file’s activity table lists 60,019 transactions during 2025 to remove entries when the subject was found by an agency other than the one that entered the record. Those removal transactions show how finding someone in one jurisdiction changes a record submitted in another.

An officer or dispatcher submits identifying information and receives a response when it matches a record. Police call that result a hit. The response alone does not establish the person’s identity or direct an officer to act.

For a warrant, receiving that match and confirming it with the agency that entered the record are separate steps. Before taking action based on an active record, the receiving agency must seek confirmation of its validity and accuracy from the agency that submitted it.

The agencies supplying records retain responsibility for their accuracy, timeliness and completeness. The FBI operates the national system, while the agency with the underlying case must keep its entry up to date. A court’s decision to recall a warrant therefore has to reach the people maintaining the police record.

Checks before and after entry

The FBI’s February 2023 privacy assessment describes those responsibilities and safeguards intended to catch mistakes at several stages. The system screens submissions and rejects records containing certain common errors. FBI staff perform quality checks, and the bureau periodically supplies agencies with lists of their active records for review.

Agencies must periodically validate their records, checking that the information remains accurate, timely, relevant and complete. A record that is not validated in time is purged from the active file and retired. Under the policy, the entering agency controls changes to its records.

Periodic upkeep continues after a record has been accepted, separate from the required verification before action. For certain records, accompanying caveats tell authorized users the limited purposes for which they may use the information. If investigators identify unauthorized changes, agencies would need to know which entries were affected before determining what requires rechecking.

Herring’s case involved county records and is separate from this inquiry. It documented what happened when a police record failed to reflect a court’s action.

Anderson and a deputy followed Herring from the impound lot and stopped him a few hundred yards from the sheriff’s office. Morgan could not find the paper warrant to fax, so she called a court clerk and learned it had been recalled. She immediately notified Pope, who contacted Anderson by radio. The court’s opinion describes these events unfolding in 10 to 15 minutes. By the time the correction reached Anderson, Herring had already been arrested.

The search yielded methamphetamine and a pistol, which he could not legally possess as a felon. In 2009, the Supreme Court held that the evidence need not be excluded under those circumstances of isolated negligence.

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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. She argued that the majority underestimated the gravity of police recordkeeping errors and that excluding the evidence would give police an incentive to maintain the integrity of their records. Her concern extended beyond Dale County to the increasing role of electronic databases in policing and the consequences of inaccurate information shared across jurisdictions.

Watchlist training

The FBI did not check for the inclusion of terrorist watchlist training in its audits of state systems agencies, a Government Accountability Office report released in January 2026 found. States were responsible for training NCIC users, and the bureau had responsibilities for overseeing those efforts.

The report examined a different use of NCIC, the handling of terrorist watchlist encounters. During routine police interactions, officers can receive information through NCIC advising them to contact the FBI’s Threat Screening Center when there is a possibility of a positive watchlist match.

In 12 of 26 interviews, officials said officers did not consistently report possible watchlist encounters when reporting was warranted. Officials in nine interviews believed their officers were reporting encounters. GAO conducted 26 interviews with officials representing 55 nonfederal law enforcement entities. The interviews included officials in four selected states and officials from national associations. The interview findings cannot be generalized nationally.

Officials in six of the 26 interviews said the relevant watchlist information was sometimes difficult to see amid other results on their screens. The report also identified unfamiliarity with the watchlist’s purpose or the FBI’s expectations as reasons officers might fail to report an encounter.

The FBI concurred with recommendations to better assess reporting gaps, improve communication and monitor state training.

The September portal investigation

The FBI had addressed a separate security episode in September involving its employment portal. In its statement about FBIJobs.gov, the bureau acknowledged a criminal group’s claim that the portal had been compromised and employee personal information affected. It said the point of breach was undetermined and that it was investigating while working with third-party providers to reduce risk.

ShinyHunters claimed it had obtained sensitive agents’ information. That claim was broader than what the bureau’s statement established.

Can the FBI say which entries, if any, must be rechecked?

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the National Crime Information Center?

The FBI operates NCIC so authorized law enforcement agencies can share records on wanted and missing people and on property such as stolen firearms.

What is known about the suspected intrusion?

People briefed on the inquiry said the FBI was investigating. As of Nov. 21, public information had yet to establish what was accessed, whether records changed or whether police lost access.

How do officers confirm a warrant found in NCIC?

The agency that receives a match must confirm the record with the agency that submitted it before acting on it. The submitting agency is responsible for keeping its information current.

What did the Government Accountability Office find?

In January 2026, the GAO reported that FBI audits of state systems agencies did not check whether those agencies trained users to handle terrorist watchlist notifications. The FBI agreed to the GAO’s recommendations.

How large was NCIC before the reported incident?

The FBI reported a system high of more than 19.3 million records in fiscal 2025. That total covers records across the system.

AI-generated summary, reviewed by an editor. More on our AI guidelines.

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